

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. EGFW 5774

CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief of Base, Frankfurt

DATE 13 Nov 57 13 29

FROM Chief, EE

INFO: Chief of Station, Germany
Chief of Base, Pullach

SUBJECT { GENERAL Operational/UPSWING/CART
SPECIFIC CARETINA

REFERENCE: EGFA 17577 7 August 1957
FROB 8607 17 October 1957

1. We overlooked the fact that an answer was requested from Headquarters with respect to paragraph 4 of reference B. For the record, we would like to note our approval of the FOB suggestion made there.

2. The indications in Reference B to the effect that CARETINA is not on the verge of death seem to quash at least for the present the ops plan outlined by [] in Reference A. We would, however, like to have a full report on CARETINA's condition from the doctor in Duesseldorf together with [] comments and interpretation. We are of course presuming that [] can get hold of the Duesseldorf doctor's report.

3. We would like to note for the record that we are very interested in a complete debriefing of CARETINA and have given considerable thought to [] proposal for setting up a unilateral debriefing of CARETINA. Had the medical report been as gloomy as [] had thought it would be, we would have been prepared to approve [] plan or some variation thereof. The only sizeable flaw that we could see was the difficulty [] might have had convincing CARETINA that UPSWING would never take CARETINA on as a staffer because of his precarious health. CARETINA seems now to be on a retainer and as long as UPSWING continues that "salary," UPSWING will probably be able to retain CARETINA's complete loyalty. This may seem somewhat moot at the present, but the situation could change and this is a point to be kept in mind. For the present, however, it appears that we had best work toward getting UPSWING to debrief CARETINA or to permit us to debrief him.

4. Regardless of whether or not [] can get the medical report on CARETINA, we suggest that [] request a copy of it from Dr. OTTO. We have a legitimate and already expressed interest in CARETINA, and such a

(Releasing officer)

(Coordinating officer)

(Authenticating officer)

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

request from [] should be expected by UPSWING. Then too this will serve as a device to restate our concern over UPSWING's failure to get a debriefing of CARETINA. Once [] has the medical report from Dr. OTTO, he can wait a few days and then reapproach UPSWING stating that we consider it very possible that CARETINA may die at any time and that it is urgent that a debriefing be obtained soonest. We have no illusions about the kind of material we will miss should UPSWING do the debriefing unilaterally, but half a loaf is better than none.

5. Incidentally, the whole question of [] is-a-vis CARETINA and UPSWING is one which we do not feel can be decided one way or the other. We note that [] feels [] is working well with respect to CARETINA, and we appreciate that no one is better placed to gauge this than []. On the other hand, we note UPSWING's queries and comments which indicate a probing action by UPSWING if not actual suspicion about [] present position. Whatever may be UPSWING's actual belief it does strike us that the picture UPSWING has, has been complicated by at least one factor not of our own making. The financial support given CARETINA's family by [] countryman, Dr. Ralph WINGER, must appear very suspicious to any CART oriented UPSWINGER. Any incident therefore whether a free medical examination or merely a dinner engagement involving [] and CARETINA is bound to awaken UPSWING curiosity whenever it is reported. It strikes us, however, that as long as any incident can be based on the friendship that exists, no greater damage can be done than was initially inherent in the relationship. The basis for UPSWING conjecture already exists. Additional bases for conjecture do not seem to us to give rise to conviction as long as there is a reasonable explanation for the incidents. What must be avoided at all costs is not so much contact as unguarded remarks either by [] or POB, and we see no cause for alarm in this direction.

31 October 1957 EE/G/U [] :clt
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